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i n 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SANDY CITY, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
Respondent, 
vs. 
) Appeal Case No. 890442-CA 
JERRY ROOKS, 
) Priority No. 2 
Defendant, 
Appellant. ) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has authority to hear 
this appeal pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(d), Utah Code 
Annotated, which provides that the rules of practice for the 
Court of Appeals and circuit courts promulgated by the 
Judicial Commission apply to appeals from the circuit 
courts. Rule 3 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals 
provides that appeals may be taken from final judgments of 
the circuit court by filing a Notice of Appeal with the 
clerk of the particular court from which the appeal is taken 
within the time allowed by Rule 4 (which is 3 0 days). 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear 
1 
this case under the above section inasmuch as this is an 
appeal from a jury verdict and judgment in the Third Circuit 
Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Sandy Department, 
involving a criminal matter. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a jury verdict of "Guilty" 
against the Defendant, JERRY ROOKS, for violation of Sandy 
City Ordinances, 3-1-14, "Dog Attacking Person or Animals" 
rendered in the Third Circuit Court for Salt Lake County, 
Utah, Sandy Department on June 16, 1989, with the Honorable 
Robin W. Reese, presiding. 
The appeal was filed on or about June 18, 1989 with 
the Clerk of the Court for the Circuit Court for Salt Lake 
County, Sandy Department, State of Utah, and was 
subsequently filed with the Utah Court of Appeals on July 
14, 1989. 
Defendant was charged with exercising charge, care, 
custody or control over a dog, not legally his, that 
allegedly attacked certain sheep 
belonging to a complainant, several of which were killed and 
still others of which were bitten and torn, and which 
occurred within the city limits of Sandy City on or about 
December 24, 1988. The statute provides that one having 
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control over such an animal in liable in damages for the 
actual losses sustained by the complainant. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The Defendant claims believes the following issues 
are presented with this appeal: 
(a) Is the ordinance under which the 
Defendant, Jerry Rooks, was convicted, unconstitutional in 
that it did not afford the Defendant reasonable notice of 
the type of conduct proscribed under the law? 
(b) Is the ordinance under which the 
Defendant, Jerry Rooks, was convicted, void for vagueness? 
(c) Is the ordinance under which the 
Defendant, Jerry Rooks, was convicted, misapplied by the 
trial Judge? Should the judge have required in jury 
instruction number nine that the jury find an element of 
"intent" in order to find the defendant guilty? 
(d) Did the trial court judge misapply the 
law by allowing the Defendant's pre-trial statement to be 
introduced into evidence? 
STATEMENT OF DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
This appeal is from a Jury Verdict of Guilty 
involving an alleged violation of a Sandy City Ordinance, 
Section 3-1-14, to wit: 
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3-1-4. Dogs Attacking Persons and 
Animals. 
(a) Attacking dogs. It shall be 
unlawful for the owner or person having charge, 
care, custody or control or (sic.) any dog to 
allow such dog to attack, chase or worry any 
person, any domestic animal having a commercial 
value, or any species of hoofed protected 
wildlife, or to attack domestic fowl. Worry as 
used in this section shall mean to harrass by 
tearing, biting or shaking with the teeth. 
(b) Owner liability. The owner 
in violation of subsection (a) above shall be 
strictly liable for violation of this section. 
In addition to being subject to prosecution 
under subsection (a) above, the owner of such 
dog shall also be liable in damages to any 
person injured or to the owner of any animal(s) 
injured or destroyed thereby. 
(c) Defenses. The following 
shall be considered in mitigating the penalties 
or damages or in dismissing the charge: 
(1) That the dog was 
properly confined on the premises. 
(2) That the dog was 
deliberately or maliciously provoked. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant, Jerry Rooks, had owned a large while 
Malamute dog proir to September, 1988. He had owned the dog 
approximately two years; however, the dog was a wanderer, 
and would often be gone for periods of time from the 
Defendant's home. In addition, the Defendant had physically 
restrained the dog in his fenced back yard, by placing him 
on a chain. He had been able to break loose from the chain, 
and climb over the fence and leave. 
Owing to these conditions, and the fact that he had 
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a young child at home, he decided to take the dog to the 
Sandy City Animal Shelter in September, 1988, and leave it 
for adoption or to be destroyed. 
Some days later, and without any knowledge thereof 
on the part of Mr. Rooks, the dog was legally adopted by one 
Janice Mauldin. She had the dog tagged, and it was given a 
rabies shot. The dog was taken home by her where it stayed 
until approximately the end of October, 1988. While the dog 
was at her home, it left on occasion, and eventually found 
its way back to Mr. Rook's home. 
The first time it appeared at Mr. Rook's home, he 
found the new dog tag on the dog, and through the animal 
shelter found out that Mrs. Mauldin had adopted the dog. He 
called Mrs. Mauldin to let her know the dog had returned to 
his home, and wanted to know if she would come by to pick it 
up. He had no intentions of reclaiming the dog. 
Mrs. Mauldin took the dog back, but after it left at 
the end of October, 1989, she apparently decided that she 
could not control the dog either, and without notifying 
authorities, decided, she would make no further attempts to 
find the dog or bring it back to her place. 
The Defendant, Jerry Rooks, did not see the dog 
until about a week before Christmas, 1988. The dog remained 
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at his premises for a few days. While there is no testimony 
that the dog was ever tied down or placed on restraints of 
any kind, or even fed for that matter, the jury apparently 
believed that the defendant displayed some type of control 
over the dog. 
The dog then disappeared just before Christmas, and 
it was claimed that this dog along with another dog attacked 
sheep belonging to Mr. Donald Steadman at 10331 South State 
Street, Sandy, Utah. Several of Mr. Steadman1s sheep were 
killed and several others were severely injured as a result 
of the attacks, though no one actually saw the animals being 
attacked. 
The following morning when the carnage was 
discovered, the dog identified as Mrs. Mauldin's malamute 
was discovered on the premises, near one of the dead sheep 
and was shot to death. 
There was never any evidence that Mr. Rooks was (a) 
the owner of the dog at the time it attacked the sheep, or 
(b) that Mr. Rooks was aware that the dog was likely to 
attack the sheep. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Defendant alleges that the ordinance is void and 
thus unenforceable, and secondly that the Court misapplied 
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the law in jury instruction number 9, by failing to point 
out to the jurors specific wording in the ordinance which 
suggests that for one to be liable one must allow the animal 
over which he exercises control to attack other animals. 
Such a provision implies knowledge; however, this ordinance 
was imposed as if the Defendant were strictly liable. 
The Defendant relies upon the Constitution of the 
United States (14th Amendment) and the State of Utah 
(Article 1, Section 7), and Sandy City Ordinance 3-1-14, as 
well as upon applicable the following Utah and out-of-state 
case law regarding vague statutes and statements taken prior 
to having given appropriate Miranda warnings: 
ARGUMENT 
I 
WAS THE ORDINANCE UNDER WHICH THE DEFENDANT, 
JERRY ROOKS, WAS CONVICTED, UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
IN THAT IT DID NOT AFFORD HIM REASONABLE NOTICE 
OF THE TYPE OF CONDUCT ONE WHICH IS PROSCRIBED? 
The ordinance under which the Defendant was 
prosecuted fails to give anyone in the defendant's position 
reasonable notice of the types of conduct which are 
prohibited. 
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Section 3-1-14 of the Sandy City Ordinance provides: 
3-1-4. Dogs Attacking Persons and 
Animals. 
(a) Attacking dogs. It shall be 
unlawful for the owner or person having charge, 
care, custody or control or (sic.) any dog to 
allow such dog to attack, chase or worry any 
person, any domestic animal having a commercial 
value, or any species of hoofed protected 
wildlife, or to attack domestic fowl. Worry as 
used in this section shall mean to harrass by 
tearing, biting or shaking with the teeth. 
(b) Owner liability. The owner 
in violation of subsection (a) above shall be 
strictly liable for violation of this section. 
In addition to being subject to prosecution 
under subsection (a) above, the owner of such 
dog shall also be liable in damages to any 
person injured or to the owner of any animal(s) 
injured or destroyed thereby. 
(c) Defenses. The following 
shall be considered in mitigating the penalties 
or damages or in dismissing the charge: 
(1) That the dog was 
properly confined on the premises. 
(2) That the dog was 
deliberately or maliciously provoked. 
The ordinance does not place anyone but the owner on 
notice of the imposition of "strict liability" for allowing 
the dog to "worry" another person or animal. In this case 
there is no question but that the owner of the dog in 
question at the time was Janice Mauldin. The most that 
could be inferred from the evidence was that the Defendant, 
Jerry Rooks, engaged in some type of control over the animal 
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prior to the events in question. Since the ordinance fails 
to place persons in the Defendant's position on notice that 
they are to be held strictly liable in the event the dog 
"worrys" another person or animal, it is unconstitutional 
for the Subsection (b) of the ordinance to be applied 
against Mr. Rooks. 
Secondly, Subsection (a) of the ordinance 
specifically talks about the owner or one exercising control 
"allowing" the animal to "worry" another personal or animal. 
This appears to be in direct conflict with Subsection (b) of 
the ordinance which talks about "strict liability". If a 
person allows an animal to "worry" a person or other animal, 
it suggests that the owner or person in control of that 
animal knows what the dog is doing and is in a position to 
prevent such activity. 
Both restraints and duties imposed by any law must 
be clear and unequivocable. Basin Flying Service v. Public 
Service Commission, (Utah, 1975), 531 P.2d 1303. 
In this case, there is absolutely no evidence that 
Mr. Rooks knew that the dog was "worrying" Mr. Steadman's 
sheep or was about to "worry" his sheep, or that he could 
have prevented that activity. The most one could say by use 
of the word "allow" in Subsection (a) of the ordinance is 
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that the one in control must so constrain a dog as to 
prevent him from getting loose. But in this case, the owner 
would have some responsibility for restraining a dog, but 
not necessarily one who may exercise some control over the 
dog in question. Certainly, Mr. Rooks never considered the 
dog to be his after he had taken the dog to the pound in 
September, 1988, and while he may have had some feelings 
towards the dog, he never attempted to restrain him after 
that period, nor should he have been required to do so, 
unless the dog were actually his. 
II 
WAS THE ORDINANCE UNDER WHICH THE DEFENDANT, 
JERRY ROOKS, WAS CONVICTED, VOID FOR VAGUENESS? 
Section 3-1-14, Sandy City Ordinance cannot be read 
to clarify the vaugueness presented between Subparagraph (a) 
of the ordinance which suggests that one must have some 
intent in allowing his dog to "worry" another person or 
animal, and Subparagraph (b) which imposes strict liability 
upon the owner of the dog who allows it to "worry" another 
person or animal. 
In addition, it would be improper to force 
Subparagraph (b) to mean that "owner" includes one who 
exercises some control over the dog. This is especially 
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true since Subparagraph (a) talks about "owners11 as well as 
any person having charge, caref custody or control over a 
dog. It would have been just as easy for the city council 
to include the same wording in Subparagraph (b) of the 
ordinance, which talks about strict liability. Since they 
did not include the specific wording to include others 
having charge, care, custody and control in Subparagraph 
(b), one must assume they mean to exclude those persons from 
having strict liability. 
A statute which effects fundamental liberties is 
unconstitutional if its is so vague that men of common 
intelligence must necessarily guess about its meaning. In 
re Brayer, (Utah 1981), 636 P.2d 1085; State v. Lindguist, 
(Utah) 674 P.2d 1234. 
Secondly, laws must be explicit for those who are to 
apply them, and they are vague and impermissible if they 
leave basic policy matters to the police or judges and 
juries. Greyned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 92 
S.Ct. 2294, 2299, 33 L.Ed. 2nd 222 
III 
WAS THE ORDINANCE UNDER WHICH THE DEFENDANT, 
JERRY ROOKS, WAS CONVICTED, MISAPPLIED BY 
THE TRIAL JUDGE? 
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The trial judge ordered that Jury Instruction No. 9 
be given to the Jury as follows: 
"You are instructed that the offense of 
a Dog Attacking Persons or Animals is a strict 
liability offense for any owner of a dog. If 
you find that the Defendant was the owner or 
custodian of the dog, then he can be found 
guilty of the offense without any proof that he 
intended to allow the dog to attack, chase, or 
worry the animals in question." (Emphasis 
added.) 
He failed (see Transcript, Page 20, lines 10-25, and 
Page 21, lines 1-16) to give the instruction offered by the 
defendant which read as follows: 
"You are instructed that the offense of 
a Dog Attacking Persons or Animals is a strict 
liability offense for any owner of a dog. If 
you find the Defendant was the owner of the dog, 
then he can be found guilty of the offense 
without any proof that he intended to allow the 
dog to attack, chase or worry the animals in 
question." 
The trial judge was reading into Subparagrpah (b) of 
the ordinance what he thought the council meant to include. 
Any yet, it is clear from Subparagraph (a) they could have 
included "custodians" if they had intended to do so, since 
they already had those kinds of persons in mind when 
enacting Subparagraph (a). 
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IV 
BEFORE ONE CAN BE CONVICTED UNDER THE 
CRIMINAL STATUTE UNDER WHICH THE DEFEDANT, 
JERRY ROOKS, WAS FOUND GUILTY, DOES THERE 
HAVE TO BE CRIMINAL "INTENT" PRESENT? 
As has been previously pointed out, Subsection (a) 
of 3-1-14 of the Sandy City Ordinance, by using the word 
"allow" the law presupposes that the owner or one having or 
exercising control over an animal, must have some intent in 
permitting the dog to worry another person or animal. 
One of the essential elements of any criminal 
conduct is "intent". Thus a crime is deemed to have been 
committed when one acts knowingly and wilfully, and 
intentionally. One acts "intentionally" or "with intent" 
when his conscious objective is to cause the specific result 
proscribed by the statute defining the offense. 
In this case there was never any evidence to suggest 
that such was the conduct of the defendant, Jerry Rooks. He 
was convicted under a "strict liability" theory. While the 
doctrine of "strict liability" may be sufficient under tort 
law to find one liable for damages, it does not ipso facto 
carry over into criminal law. There, the standards are 
much higher before one can be found guilty of an offense. 
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In every case one acts either intentionally to cause the 
result proscribed by the statute, or acts recklessly or with 
criminal negligence, that is, acting in such a way that 
suggests gross deviation from the standard of care a 
reasonable person would exercise, or in such a way that he 
fails to perceive a substantial and unjustified risk will 
result or that a circumstance exists. 
Nothing in the evidence or instructions were 
intended to be given to indicate to the jury that the 
Defendant must first have been found to have acted 
intentionally, or recklessly or with criminal negligence 
before he could be found guilty of violating the ordinance. 
V 
DID THE COURT PROPERLY ALLOW THE 
DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT INTO EVIDENCE? 
Diana Albrand, formerly a Sandy City Animal Control 
Officer, testified that she was requested by Sandy City 
Police Officer, Wendy Thompson, to contact Mr. Rooks and set 
up an appointment in reference to the killing of Mr. 
Steadman's sheep, following the December 24, 1988 incident. 
(Transcript, page 6, lines 8-12). 
She apparently had him come down to the Shelter, and 
advised him that although he was not under arrest, she 
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wanted him to make a statement. She stated that she did not 
read his Miranda warnings to him (Transcript, page 7, lines 
3-6, but claimed she did tell him he had a right to remain 
silent, and that anything he said or wrote could be held 
against him.fl 
She did not say anything to him about his right to 
counsel (Transcript, page 8, lines 21-25) since he was not 
under arrest. He was apparently a suspect, though 
uncharged, at the time was asked to write the witness 
statement. (Transcript, page 11, lines 17-22). 
Ms. Albrand did not write the statement concerning 
the Miranda warning in Mr. Rook's presence, thus giving him 
an opportunity to object, if he so desired. (Transcript, 
page 12, lines 17-21) 
Mr. Rooks believed he was filling out the statement 
to be a good citizen (Transcript, page 15, lines 2-3), and 
part way through writing the statement recalls being told he 
was to have been supplied his Miranda warnings by Ms. 
Albrand. At that time he asked her to be supplied a lawyer, 
and she refused, saying there was no case just then, and 
that it would be up to the judge to decide whether he was to 
have been provided a lawyer or not. (Transcript, page 15, 
lines 18-24) 
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In the case at hand, the Defendant's statement was 
delivered to the jury, over the objection of defense 
counsel, and became one of the exhibits for the jury to 
consider. 
Since at the time, the Defendant was an unindicted 
suspect, and since the Animal Control Officer claimed she 
gave the Defendant the Miranda warning, she also has a duty 
to terminate the request for the admission or confession 
within the statement, if the Defendant so requests. Where, 
as here, it was apparent that the Defendant requested 
counsel when told of the Miranda warnings and was denied 
such, the statement would be tainted, and should not have 
been admitted into evidence. State v Louden, 387 P.2nd 240, 
15 Utah 2nd 64, vacated 85 S.C. 87, 378 U.S. 1, 13 L.Ed. 2nd 
33. 
The Defendant should have not been subjected to a 
statement where he is a suspect, until has was advised of 
his rights. State v. Easthope 510 P2nd 933, 29 Ut.2nd 400. 
And a defendant has a right to remain silent and his 
rights to counsel is required prior to any interrogation by 
any police officer. State v. Shuman, 405 P2nd 837, 241 Ore. 
450; State y^_ Adams, (Utah, 1978) 583 P.2d 89. 
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CONCLUSION 
The law, Sancy City Ordinance, 3-1-14, is vague, in 
that it requires to Court to try to postulate what the 
legislature meant regarding the abiguities found between 
Subcetion (a) and Subsection (b) of the ordinance. 
Secondly, the ordiance appears to require "strict 
liability" on the part of an owner, and ignores "intent" 
altogether. Thus, one of the essential elements of any 
criminal act is ignored here. 
Thirdly, the Defendant was not the "owner" of the 
dog in question at the time of the offense, and under 
Subsection (b) of the ordinance, cannot be found to be 
strictly liable. 
Fourthly, the Defendant's statement is tainted, and 
should not have been allowed into evidence since his Miranda 
warning was flawed. 
The Court of Appeals should find sufficient errors 
in the lower court proceedings to either (a) find that the 
ordinance under which the Defendant was convicted so vague 
as to have violated his constitutional rights, and/or (b) 
that the Defendant should be entitled to a new trial. 
17 
c$h DATED thiSc-^ 43 day of December, 1989. 
5AVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
JERRY ROOKS 
Suite 280 
310 East 4500 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 269-8190 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Defendant/Appellant's Brief on Appeal 
to,the following Counsel for the Plaintiff, Sandy City, this 
c-^ y day of December, 1989: 
CLIFFORD W. LARK 
Sandy City Prosecutor 
Attorney at Law 
440 East 8680 South 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
\&^ 
DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
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DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
State Bar No. 2993 
Attorney for Defendant 
-JERRY ROOKS 
Suite 300 
6925 Union Park Center 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: 566-3373 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, SANDY DEPARTMENT 
SANDY CITY, 
VS. 
JERRY ROOKS, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Case No. 89000089 MC 
Honorable Robin W. Reese 
COMES NOW the Defendant, JERRY ROOKS, and 
repsectfully Appeals to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant 
to Section 77-35-26, Utah Code of Criminal Procedure, from 
that Jury Verdict of Guilty made and entered in the above 
captioned matter on or about June 16, 1989 before the 
Honorable Robin W. Reese, in connection with a charge of 
violating Sandy City Ordinance 3-1-14, Dog Attacking Person 
or Animals, claimed to have occurred on or about December 
24, 1988 at 10331 South State Street, Snady, Utah, 
DATED this day of June, 1989. 
DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
Attorney for Defendant 
Suite 300 
6925 Union Park Center 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: (801) 566-3373 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal to the following 
Counsel for the Plaintiff, Sandy City, this day of June, 
1989: 
CLIFFORD W. LARK 
Attorney at Law 
440 East 8680 South 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SANDY DEPARTMENT 
SANDY CITY, a municipal 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JERRY ROOKS 
DOB: 
d/b/a: 
88-8669 
INFORMATION 
Case Ko.%<?/OO0O$tfmZ. 
Defendant, 
The undersigned complainant, LEO SMITH, under oath states on 
information and belief, that the defendant committed, in the above 
named county, the crime(s) of: 
COUNT I: DOG ATTACKING PERSONS OR ANIMALS, CLASS "B" 
at 10331 SOUTH STATE STREET, Sandy, Utah on DECEMBER 24, 1988 at 
approximately 5:00 A.M., in violation of Sandy City Ordinance 3-1-14. 
The acts of defendant in constituting the crime were: 
That the above named defendant at the above date and time being the 
owner or person having charge, care or custody or control of a dog did 
allow such dog to attack, chase or worry a person, a domestic animal 
having a commercial value, or a species of hoofed protected wildlife 
or domestic fowl. 
Victim: DONALD L. STEADMAN 
Victim's property: SHEEP $2800.00 
COUNT II: 
Compl ainari t
 r^~. 
Subscr ibed and sworn t o on: J&ptiik 
I t shall be unlawful for any person or entity except an authorized 
governmental animal welfare society incorporated within the State of Utah 
under Sect ion 76-9-302, U.C.A., 1953, as amended, to harbor or keep any los t 
or strayed dog. Whenever any dog shal l be found which appears to be los t or 
s t rayed, i t shall be the duty of the finder to notify the Animal Control 
Division within 24 hours, and the Department shall impound the dog as herein 
provided. 
3-1-10. Dogs Running At Large. ££fLAC£2 8 / cftXttfoCE •*¥ ?I-7(* 
"Ife-shakl^be^m^ person'having chargeJrcare', 
custody or control of any dqg to-allow such dog-at any time to run at-largee 
Ihe owner or person charged with responsibility" for a dog found running- at 
la rge shal l be s t r i c t l y l iable for a violation-of this section regard less^ f 
the precautions taken to prevent the escape of the dog and regard less-of-* 
whether or not he knows the dog i s -running -at--large.-
3-1-11 . Dogs On Unenclosed P r e s s e s . 
I t shal l be unlawful for any person to chain, stake out, or te ther 
any dog in any unenclosed premises in such a manner that the animal may go 
beyond the property l ine unless such person has permission of the owner of the 
affected property. 
3-1-12. Female Dogs In Heat. 
Any owner or person having charge, care, custody or control of any 
female dog in heat shal l , in addition to restraining such dog from running at 
l a rge , cause such dog to be constantly confined in a building or secure 
enclosure so as to prevent i t from at t ract ing by scent or coming into contact 
with other dogs and creating a nuisance, except for planned breeding. 
3-1-13. Places Prohibited To Dogs. 
(a) I t sha l l be unlawful for any person to take or permit any dog, 
vfoether loose or on a leash or in arms, in or about any establishment or place 
of business where food or food products are sold or displayed, including but 
not limited to restaurants , grocery s tores , meat markets, and f ru i t or 
vegetable s tores . 
(b) I t shal l be unlawful for any person keeping, harboring or having 
charge or control of any dog to allow said dog to be within any watershed area 
so designated by ordinance or otherwise legally appointed, e i ther now existing 
or to be defined in the future. 
(c) I t sha l l be unlawful for any person to allow any dog to enter or 
be in any place of *x>rship during public services or in any public school 
building while school i s in session, except for purposes of instruction when 
authorized by a teacher at the said school directly involved with the said 
instruction* 
3-1-14. Dogs Attacking Persons And Animals.^ 
(a) Attacking dogs. I t sha l l be unlawful for the owner or person 
having charge, care, custody or control or any dog to allow such dog to 
attack, chase or v?orry any person, any domestic animal having a cocnrercial 
value, or any species of hoofed protected vildlife, or to attack domestic 
fowl. Worry as used in this section shall mean to harrass by tearing, biting 
or shaking with the teeth. 
(b) Owner liability. The owner in violation of subsection (a) above 
shall be strictly liable for violation of this section. In addition to being 
subject to prosecution under subsection (a) above, the owner of such dog shall 
also be liable in damages to any person injured or to the or.cner of any 
animal(s) injured or destroyed thereby. 
(c) Defenses. The following shall be considered in mitigating the 
penalties or damages or in dismissing the charge: 
(1) That the dog was properly confined on the premises. 
(2) That the dog was deliberately or maliciously provoked. 
(d) Dogs May Be Killed. Any person may kill a dog while it is 
committing any of the acts specified in subsection (a) above or vhile such dog 
is being pursued thereafter. 
3-1-15* Fierce, Dangerous Or Vicious Animals. 
It shall be unlawful for the owner of any fierce, dangerous, or 
vicious animal to permit such animal to go or be ofF^tHF^prenises^Sf' the owner 
mless such animal is under restraint and properly muzzled so as to prevent it 
from injuring any person or property. Every animal so vicious and dangerous 
that it cannot be controlled by reasonable restraints, and every dangerous and 
vicious animal not effectively controlled by its owner or person having 
charge, care or control of such animal, so that it shall not injure any person 
or property, is a hazard to public safety and the Director of Animal Control 
shall seek a court order pursuant to Section 31 for destruction of or mulling 
of the animal. 
3-1-16* Nuisance: Animals. 
Any owner or person having charge, care, custody or control of an 
animal or animals causing a nuisance as defined below shall be in violation of 
this title and subject to the penalties provided herein. The following shall 
be deaned a nuisance; 
(a) Any animal \foich: 
(1) causes damages to the property of anyone other than its 
owner; 
(2) is a vicious animal as defined herein and kept contrary to 
Section 15 above; 
(3) causes unreasonable fouling of the air by odors; 
-••••s^ o in pnrlosures or surroundings; 
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SANDY, UTAH; THURSDAY, MARCH 16, 1989 
-ooOoo-
THE COURT: Sandy City versus Jerry Rooks. 
Is the City ready on this one, Mr. Lark? 
MR. LARK: I just noticed that one of my 
witnesses is here. Are you Janice? 
THE COURT: All right. This is the day and 
time set for hearing on defendant Mr. Rooks1 motion to 
suppress, alleged admissions made by the defendant; is 
that right, Mr. Smith? 
MR. SMITH: That's correct. 
1 2
 I THE COURT: All right. Go ahead and call your 
'3 I first witness. 
MR. LARK: Your Honor, I feel like I need a 
little bit more to go on in this case. I'm not sure what 
the basis is for suppressing those statements. Is it Mirand^ 
is it another rule of evidence? I don't understand. 
MR. SMITH: It's Miranda. 
MR. LARK: So I assume that I'd only need my 
animal control officer. 
MR. SMITH: Well, I don't know. 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
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20 
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23 
2 2
 MR. LARK: I don't know of any other statements 
made to — The only statements I know of that were made, 
2
* so far in my investigation, were statements made to this 
2
^ animal control officer and this woman, Janice Mauldin, 
3 
1 who is a private citizen. Are those the only two you know 
2 I of? 
MR. SMITH: Well, I don't know of any more. 
4
 THE COURT: So the basis for your objection, 
5 Mr. Smith, is that prior to a statement, an in-custody 
6 statement, to a police officer or animal control officer, 
7 no Miranda was given; is that correct? 
8 MR. SMITH: That's correct. 
9
 THE COURT: So we would not need the civilian. 
10 That would be irrelevant. 
11 MR. SMITH: I would think so. 
12 THE COURT: Yeah. So you may -- you may dismiss 
13 the civilian witness for purposes of this hearing. Any 
'4 statement made to her would be admissible,whether or not 
15 J Miranda. 
MR. LARK: The City will then call Diana Albrand 16 
18 
20 
I7 THE COURT: Mr. Lark, may I — do you have 
a yellow piece of paper I could borrow? 
19 MR. LARK: Just a blank one? 
THE COURT: From your legal pad, or is that 
21 J something else? 
2 2
 I MR. LARK: No, theyfre all written on. I've 
23 only got the small one. 
2 4
 I THE COURT: Well, the small one will do. Just 
2
* I to take some notes on. I used all the paper I had on 
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Mr. Yengich's -- All right. Thank you. 
DIANA ALBRAND, 
called as a witness by the plaintiff, having been duly 
sworn, was examined and testified on her oath as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. LARK: 
Q. Would you state your name — well, your name 
and address for the court. 
k Okay. My name is Diana Albrand. My address 
is 603 East and 10315 South. 
THE COURT: Spell the last name, please. 
THE WITNESS: .A-1-b-r-a-n-d. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
ft (By Mr. Lark) Have you recently worked for 
Sandy City Animal Control? 
A. Yes. I was employed for Sandy City Animal 
Control for two years. My termination date was 3-10 of 
'89. 
ft During that period of time did you take a statemejnt 
from the defendant Jerry Rooks seated on the left-hand 
| side of 
A. 
Q. 
the defendants table? 
Yes, I did. 
Would you describe the circumstances under which 
5 
1 that statement was taken? 
2 A. Okay. Would you like me to start from the 
3 first I spoke with Mr. Rooks? 
4 Q. Give us enough background so --
5 A. I spoke with him on the phone. 
6 I Q. -- we can understand why — why you eventually 
7 got together to take the statement. 
8 A. All right. I was requested by 
9 Officer Wendy Thompson, who was the original officer on 
10 the case, to see if I could contact Mr. Rooks and set up 
11 an appointment that she could meet with him in reference 
12 to this incident. 
13 I called Mr. Rooks at his employment, I believe 
14 7-Day Tire, and asked him if it would be possible for 
15 Officer Thompson to meet with him either at work or at 
16 home. He said it would be a problem for him if she met 
17 him at work and when he was going to be home she was not 
18 going to be on duty. So I asked him if he could come in 
19 and fill out a witness statement and he said he could. 
20 He came in, I believe it was in the morning 
21 the next day or within the next few days, and he was not 
22 under arrest. However, I did advise him that he was not 
23 obligated to write the statement and that if --
24 Q. Would you state --
25 A. -- he did -- Oh, go ahead. 
3 
4 
• Q. Would you state exactly what you told him in 
2
 I regard to his Miranda rights? 
A. Okay. I did not read it from the card, I just 
said to him, "You have the right to remain silent. If --
5 Anything you say or write can be held against you." And 
6
 I said, "Do you understand it?" He said, "Yes, I do." 
' J Qi Now, you said he wasn't under arrest. 
A. No. 
' Ql In other words, he came -- he came to your 
'0 office — 
11
 A. Willingly. 
'2 I Q. And you didn't have handcuffs on him at the 
time, I assume. 
A. No. 
Q. Was he, as far as you were concerned, was he 
free to leave? 
A. Yes. He just wanted to make the statement 
clear as to who did or did not own the dog. He made a 
statement to me that he did know Mrs. Mauldin, that the 
dog would go between the two residences. And he said, 
2 M "I really don!t know what to put on this stcitement. " 
2 2
 I And I said, lfJust write what happened and, 
you know, who owns the dog and who doesn't own the dog." 
He asked me if I knew — he said he had talked 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
23 
24 
2
* to Mrs. Mauldin and that they had agreed to share the damages 
1
 And he said, "Do you know what they are?" And I said I 
2
 did not. He sat down at the table and started writing 
I the witness statement and I went into the back room, 
answering phones and such. At that time I was writing 
* I my report as to what I had told him, while he was writing 
his in the front. I believe he asked me again what the 
damages were. Ifm not sure, but I believe he did, and I 
8
 didn't know what they were at the time. 
9
 I Q. And then after he wrote his report what did 
he do? 
A. He gave it to me, 
10 
11 
'2 J Q. Or his statement. 
'3 I A. He just handed it to me and I told him I 
•* I appreciated him coming in and he said okay, and he left. 
'^  I Oh, one more thing. I did ask him if it would 
16 
17 
18 
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22 
23 
24 
be possible for Officer Thompson to come to the residence 
and take a photograph of the second dog that lived at that 
residence. And he said there would be no problem in that. 
Q. Did you — By the way, when you gave him his -
described his Miranda rights. I know you said you did it 
informally -- did you say anything about a right to counsel? 
A. No, I did not. He wasn't under arrest. I reall^j 
didn't even need to tell him that, you know, he had — he 
didn't have to write the statement. I just thought, for 
2 5
 his sake, I would let him know that. 
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Q. I understand that. 
A. That it would be attached to the report, the 
original report. 
MR. LARK: 1 have no further questions. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Smith, you may 
cross-examine her. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SMITH: 
Q. Is it Albrand? 
A. Uh-huh. (Affirmative.) 
Q. Mrs. Albrand, did you — at the time that you 
talked to Mr. Rooks and asked him if he would come in to 
make a statement, did you advise him that he was a suspect 
in this case? What did you say to him in that regard? 
A. I said I was calling in reference to a Malamute, 
that we had spoken to Mrs. Maulden and she said that she 
adopted the dog from Sandy Animal Control and took it and 
got a rabies certificate on it and a couple weeks later 
the dog disappeared and apparently went to Mr. Rooks' 
residence. 
Mr. Rooks called — I'm not sure who he called 
to locate who owned the dog at that time and found 
Mrs. Mauldin's number. He called her and said, "I have 
the dog here," and I don't know if he said, "I'd keep it," ' 
9 ' 
1 
2 
3 
4 
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16 
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19 
20 
or what, because that was his statement. But that's how 
we found out that both the people had knowledge of the dog 
was running between the two properties. 
Okay — 
Q. Now, wait a minute. You've lost me a little 
bit. 
A. Okay. 
8
 I Q. You found that out from Mrs. Rooks or 
9
 ' Mrs. Mauldin? 
A. From Mrs. Mauldin. 
11
 I Q. Okay. 
12 J A. We -- I found that out from Officer Thompson, 
but talking to Mr. Rooks on the phone, I explained that 
we were aware that the dog was running between both residences 
and I believe I told him as far as we were concerned, they 
were both responsible because they both had knowledge that 
that dog was running at large, 
Q. So you told him that before he actually came? 
A. Before he came down to write the statement I 
did. 
2
' Q. Did you tell him that charges had been filed 
2 2
 I against him at that time? 
A. I did not, 
2
 I Q. Had charges been filed? 
!
 A. Not to my knowledge, 
10 
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Q. Were they in the process of being filed? 
A. As it wasn't my case, I don't know what the 
extent of Wendy's investigation contained. I don't know 
how far along in her report she had gotten. See, originally, 
when I made the call to Mr. Rooks it was to make an 
appointment for the officer who was handling the case. 
Q. I see . 
A. I was not. 
Q. Were you responsible for gathering witness 
statements then? 
A. No. When he came -- 1 told her that I would 
•
2
 make an attempt, that she could meet with him to take the 
report* He, when he offered to bring that witness statement 
\ in, many times another officer has collected or given suspect]. 
'*
 !
 and witnesses witness statements to fill out and collected 
'" I by another officer 
• ' Q. Okay. So he was a suspect at the time and you 
18 
advised him --
A. Yes, I advised him he was --
Q. — before he came in that he was a suspect in 
2
' this investigation? 
2 2
 A. That's right. 
2
^ I Q. And you had some knowledge, apparently before 
he came in, allegedly, that he had some control over the 
dog? 
11 
A. Uh-huh. (Affirmative.) 
Q. And when you informally advised him that the 
statement could be used against him — 
A. Uh-huh. (Affirmative.) 
5
 J Q. There is a -- some handwriting at the bottom 
of this statement which says, and I111 quote it, "Jerry 
was advised of his rights and that this statement would 
be placed in evidence." Is that your handwriting? 
9 
I A. Let me see it. I don't know. Uh-huh. (Affirmatj. 
10
 I Q. Could we mark that? 
' ' Did you — thank you 
12 Did you write that statement on there after 
13
 I he left? 
* I A. No, he was still there 
15 
Q. Do you know if he saw you write it on there? 
THE COURT: What was the question? 
MR. SMITH: Do you know if he saw you write 
it on there. 
THE WITNESS: I am not absolutely sure. Ifm 
trying to recall. I believe he was still sitting at the 
desk but I'm not sure. I can't say for sure. 
Q. (By Mr. Smith) You didn't have --
23
 I A. I would say that he did because after I had 
finished that I was holding it in my hand and he had come 
out the gate and we were talking. We had made a few other 
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You didn't 
did you? 
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Did 
No, 
I init. 
have h 
Lai it 
you have him 
I did not. 
im initial that -~ that 
or did I have -~ 
initial it. 
Okay. I don't have any further questions 
MR. 
THE 
Albrand. 
Cityr 
Smith 
defendant 
examined 
All 
LARK: 
COURT: 
right. 
s witnesses. 
? 
MR. 
THE 
SMITH: 
COURT: 
Nothin 
Okay. 
That' 
Do you 
g further. 
You may step down, 
s apparently the extent 
comment 
of 
have any witnesses to call, 
I would call Mr. Rooks. 
Okay. 
JERRY 
herein, having been 
and testified on his 
Come forward and be sworn, 
ROOKS, 
duly and legally sworn, 
oath as follows: 
was 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SMITH: 
Q. Mr. Rooks, state your name and give us your 
address. 
13 
1 A. Jerry A. Rooks, 132 East 9400 South, No. C, 
2 Sandy, Utah. 
3 Q. I want to direct your attention to this statement}: 
4 which is Defense Exhibit No. 1. Do you recall the 
5 circumstances surrounding your ~- your preparing that 
6 statement? 
7 A. Yes, I do. 
8 Q. Will you tell us basically what happened in 
9 connection with anyone contacting you to prepare a witness 
10 statement? 
I j A. I was called and asked to come down and fill 
12 o u^ a witness statement• I was told that it would be helpful' 
13 and that — I was given the impression that it wasn't really 
14 a big deal right now. 
15 Q. Do you know who — who contacted you or who 
16 you talked to? 
17 A. Other than a Sandy City Animal Control officer, 
18 no. 
19 Q. Was it Mrs. Albrand that you talked to? 
20 A. To — 
21 Q. To fill out the witness statement. 
22 A. To be exact, I couldn't say. I didn't really — 
23 the whole thing came as a shock. I didn't really pay much 
24 attention to who I was talking to. 
25 Q. Did they advise you at that time that you were 
14 
1 
2 
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If 
a suspect in the case? 
A. I was more under the impression that I was being 
a good citizen to come down and to do the situation a favor 
Q. And where did you go to make this statement? 
A. Sandy City /Vnimal Control. 
Q. And who was there? 
A. I believe it was the young lady here 
* Q. And what was said between you and her before 
9
 I you filled out the statement? 
A. As she said, I didn't know really what to put 
down and she just said to put something down, so 1 did. 
'
2
 I Q. Did she tell you before you started writing 
13 I the statement that you were a suspect? 
14
 I A. N o . 
'^  Q. Did she advise you of any Miranda rights? 
'" I A. Beforehand, no 
Q. Did she at some later point in time? 
A. Part way through writing the statement she did 
mention that she was supposed to fill me in on my Miranda 
rights and I asked her at that time if I could be supplied 
a lawyer. And she said no, that there was no case as of 
*
2
 right now, that it would be up to the judge to decide whether) 
23 there would be a case and it would be up to the judge to 
^
4
 decide whether or not counsel would be provided for me. 
** Q. Did -- in your presence did she write on that 
15 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
4 
1
 statement that she had given you the Miranda rights? 
2
 A. I never witnessed the addition to the statement. 
( After I got done -- when I first walked in, I walked back 
real quick and looked around just to see if it might have 
I been a different dog. I went back in, filled out the 
1
 statement, then I went back to the back again because there 
was a dog there that I thought was possibly Rebel- I went 
back, took a closer look at him, went to the cage, observed 
that it wasn't and then left, may have said something on 
the way out and proceeded to work. I was close to two hours 
late at this point. 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
'
2
 I MR. SMITH: I have no further questions 
13
 I THE COURT: You may cross-examine, Mr. Lark. 
14 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. LARK: 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
Q. Okay. You received the phone call and -- to 
come fill out a witness statement. And what -- you went 
voluntarily to the animal control office? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And when you -- you probably entered in the 
front door, right? 
2 3
 | A. Uh-huh. (Affirmative.) 
Q. Did you just go to the desk? 
A. Yes, I did. 
24 
25 
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* Q. And where did -- did you fill the statement 
2
 out at the desk? 
3
 I A. Yes, I did. 
Q. At any time were you told not to leave? 
A. No. 
MR. LARK: No further questions. 
MR. SMITH: Nothing further. 
THE COURT: You may step down, Mr. Rooks 
9
 I Okay. Go ahead and make your argument, Mr. Smitl 
1° I MR. SMITH: Your Honor, it seems apparent from 
11 I the testimony of Mrs. Albrand that my client was definitely 
12 I a suspect at the time that he was contacted by the officer, 
13 Wendy Thompson, and at the time that she talked with him 
14 J about making a statement. There is conflicting testimony, 
apparently, about whether or not he was told that he was 
a -- a suspect in this particular case at the time he began 
to write the statement down. In any event, itfs clear that 
Mrs. Albrand felt some duty or responsibility to give him 
a Miranda warning, which wasn't a formal Miranda warning 
but apparently was an informal off-the-cuff-type Miranda 
21 warning, and there is some confusion about when this Miranda 
22 I warning was given. But if you believe my client, it was 
at least in the process of -- during the process of writing 
24 the statement. And I would suggest that where the -- the 
25 person is a suspect, that he is required to have the Miranda 
17 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
' warning given to him appropriately, and where the confession 
2 or admission is taken, or the statement in this case is 
* taken, which has a defective warning, then the statement 
4
 J itself is inadmissible and should be suppressed 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Lark. 
MR. LARK: Your Honor, I believe this is clearly 
a case in which the Miranda rules do not apply. Number 
one, it wasn't interrogated. I found most pertinent the 
9
 j defendant's own comment that Diana said, "Just put something 
10 | down." In other words, she wasn't asking direct questions, 
11 I she was just — said, "Fill out the statement." He didn't 
12 I even know what to put on it at first. 
Probably most significant is the fact that he 
was not in custody at the time. He said that he freely 
5 
6 
7 
8 
13 
14 
18 
19 
20 
21 
15 J walked in the door, he stood at the front desk, it wasn't 
16 I in a closed room, some room where interrogations would norma]] 
17 j take place, and then he freely left afterwards, that no 
one at any time told him that he was restrained in any way 
Even if Miranda is applied, the animal control 
officer said she did give him those warnings, albeit informal] 
And I'm not sure it really matters when she did it. The 
22 point -- while he was writing the statement. She said she 
23 J did before he wrote it. But the fact of the matter is he 
24 didn't submit the statement yet so that those warnings were 
25 given before he even submitted the statement. And I'll 
18 
' conclude with that. 
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Smith? 
MR. SMITH: Submit it. 
THE COURT: Okay. As far as the Court is aware, 
5 I the Miranda warning's required by an officer to be given 
to a person who is arrested and in a custodial-type 
situation, and before the officer interrogates the person. 
8 J I suppose this could be construed as an interrogation if 
9
 f Ms. Albrand had said, "You're under arrest in this matter; 
10 j you sit down here and make a statement." But I think the 
U I courts are quite clear that where a person voluntarily submitj 
12 I himself to a police station, and in this case it was just 
an animal control office, that he is not under arrest or 
in custody, and any statements he gives do not require the 
Miranda warning. So I would deny your motion to suppress, 
Mr. Smith, and the statement of Officer — that Officer -
that the defendant made to the officer in this case 
MR. LARK: Thank you, your Honor 
THE COURT: Exhibit No, 1 will be made part 
of the file. Now, we have to set - - you filed a jury demand, 
21
 I I think, Mr. Smith 
MR. SMITH: Yes. 
2-3 [Whereupon, further proceedings were had concerni] 
24 J setting of the jury trial.] 
-ooOoo-
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SANDY, UTAH; FRIDAY, JUNE 16, 1989 
2 [Excerpt of proceedings before Judge Reese.] 
3 THE COURT: Before we go any further, I know 
4 that there were some exceptions and I assume that fs critical 
5 now, Mr. Smith, that you wanted to take to the jury 
6 instructions. We 1 11 let you make those of record now withoutj: 
7 any prejudice to the fact that you weren't allowed to 
g officially do that prior to the instructions of the jury, 
9 instructing of the jury. 
10 MR. SMITH: Yes. Thank you, your Honor. 
j] The specific exception that I wanted to take 
12 was with respect to -- I'm trying to find the instruction 
13 number, but it's the one that was modified. 
14 THE COURT: That was number — 
15 MR. SMITH: Is that 8? 
16 THE COURT: Number nine. 
17 MR. SMITH: Nine? 
18 THE COURT: The offense of dog attacking persons 
19 or animals as a strict liability offense, is that the one 
20 you mean? 
21 MR. SMITH: That is correct. I take exception 
22 to that specifically with respect to the wording that was 
23 given that this was a strict liability offense against the 
24 person or — what was your — 
25 THE COURT: The owner or custodian. 
20 
! 
2 
3 
4 
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12 
13 
MR. SMITH: Or custodian, 
THE COURT: That's right. And the reason being 
that the statute itself says the owner in violation of 
§(a) shall be strictly Liable, not custodian. I added the 
5
 J word custodian to the instruction. And I understand, Counse 
it just seemed to me that the draftsman, although not as cle< 
as it should be must have intended to include a] 1 those 
who were referenced in Subsection (a). That would be anyone 
9
 I who had charge, care, custody or control. It doesn't seem 
10 J to me there would be any policy reason that the draftsman 
H I would have intended to limit strict liability only to the 
owner when there would be many situations in which the actua]| 
owner may not have had custody of the dog for many, many 
'4 months and the person who would bear the greatest 
15 J responsibility would be the custodian. And this may be 
a classic example of that, 
17
 J Any further exceptions? 
18 j
 MR. SMITH: No, your Honor, but I would like 
19 to make a motion. 
20
 THE COURT: Okay 
21
 MR. SMITH: Motion, notwithstanding the verdict, 
22
 by finding of innocent because the statute — or the ordinancje, 
23 excuse me, itself is unclear and unspecific, and I think 
2
* j it should be declared void for vagueness. For example, 
the statute is unclear, I think, in the first section as 
21 
25 
1 to whether or not intent or knowledge is or is not required 
2 and the strict liability section seemed to suggest that 
3 knowledge or intent is not required on the part of the owner 
4 and then for the reason that I just stated as my exception 
5 for No. 9. 
6 THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. I 111 deny your 
1 motion. While it's true, and we've discussed this in my 
8 office, there does appear to be some inconsistency in the 
9 ordinance in construing the ordinance to find it constitutiorj 
10 if it can be done, and also in construing the ordinance 
IT so that the separate parts can be consistent. While that 
12 word "allow" does seem to be inconsistent with Subsection (b) 
13 Strict Liability, it could be construed that the word allow 
14 simply means absence of prevention. In other words, the 
15 draftsman could have intended that if you fail to prevent 
16 your dog from creating the kind of damage that is mentioned 
17 in Subpart A, then in effect you've allowed it to do it. 
18 Whether or not you intended the dog to commit that act or 
19 even knew that the dog would commit that act or not. I'll 
20 deny your motion. Certainly it may be something that, 
21 if you want to, that you could appeal. 
22 With respect to the issue of sentencing, 
23 Mr. Rooks, you have a right to come back for sentencing 
24 after two days but before the expiration of 30 days from 
25 J today's date. 
[Further proceedings held but not herein 
transcribed.] 22 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
s s . 
I , JERI KEARBEY, a Cert if ied Court T r a n s c r i b e r 
in and for the State of Utah, do h e r e b y cer t i fy that the foregoing 
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of the State of Utah; 
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same r e l a t e . 
DATED thi is \ day of C \ ( \cfst3: '1989 
fc 
% 
8ftr 
P£GGYaBQ¥ER ; 
& ^i***f?* 4*// 
KJT\V J ^Ci^A^y 
J e n fyearbey 
Certif ied Court T r a n s c r i b e r 
P e g g y / G r ^ y i ' r . CSR, RPR, Notary 
23 
